ABSTRACT Attack path discovery plays an important role in protecting network infrastructure. Unfortunately, previous attack path discovery algorithms are difficult for applying in reality because of the high computational complexity problem. To achieve effective attack path discovery, we proposed a compact graph planning algorithm to incorporate goal states related information into attack path discovery. Our model extracts goal states related information by calculating closure of goal states, and then construct planning graph structure given the closure, after which the backward search algorithm is used to extract the attack path solution. The experiments were done on the typical enterprise network, comparing the effectiveness of attack path discovery algorithms with existing known methods. The result turns out that our proposed compact graph planning algorithm shows great improvement in discovering attack paths.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the increasing size and complexity of computer network, cyber security problem becomes more prominent than ever. Community Emergency Response Team(CERT) points out that global network security events increase exponentially from 2003 to 2018 [1] . To cope with the problem, attack paths discovery technology [2] , which could discover hidden network vulnerabilities automatically, is widely adopted. As shown in Figure 1 , attack paths discovery technology could not only find individual vulnerability existed in each host, but combinational vulnerabilities existed in whole network. Although tools like APT2 [3] , Autosploit [4] and MulVAL [5] etc. have been developed to improve efficiency for discovering hidden attack paths, they are still far from reality because of two limitations. The first is that most of these tools, such as APT2, Autosploit and so on, aim at discovering individual vulnerabilities and fail in finding combinational vulnerabilities, and the second is that high computational complexity problem makes it hard to apply in large scale network.
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Alba Amato. To overcome these problem and improve efficiency of attack paths discovery, we propose a compact graph planning based attack paths discovery algorithm which could utilize penetration testing goal related information to prune redundant attack path branches based on a variant structure called ''compact planning graph'' [6] . The rest of this paper is FIGURE 2. Attack path discovery through attack graph technology (The first subgraph shows process of attack graph generation and the second subgraph describes attack paths vulnerability analysis [7] .).
organized as follows: Section 2 introduces some related works about attack paths discovery technology, mainly containing attack graph based methods and classical planning based methods. Section 3 describes some preliminary knowledge about functional dependency theory which is the foundation of constructing compact planning graph. Section 4 shows the details of our proposed compact graph planning based attack paths discovery algorithm, containing closure calculation of goal states set, compact planning graph construction and attack paths extraction. Section 5 compares our proposed algorithm with existing methods and gives some explanations about the results. Section 6 concludes.
II. RELATED WORKS
A rich body of works have explored various ways to achieve effective attack paths discovery, which could be divided into two categories: attack graph based methods and classical planning based methods.
Attack graph model, shorted in AG, was firstly introduced by Sheyner et al. [7] to discover hidden network vulnerabilities. Generally, attack graph could be represented as tuple <H, C, T, I, IDS>, where H represents host information, containing ip, services, softwares and vulnerabilities, C represents connectivity information, T represents trust information among hosts, I represents initial network information and IDS describes attack behaviors that could be detected. As shown in Figure 2 , there are two steps to discover attack paths through attack graph model, namely attack graph generation and vulnerability analysis. Based on attack graph, Swiler et al. adopted forward search strategy to discover hidden attack paths [8] . As forward search strategy would cause state space explosion problem, Zhang et al. shrinked state space to accelerate attack path discovery through backward search strategy on the basis of attack graph [9] . Singhal et al. combined attack graph model and probability analysis, coming up with probabilistic model to evaluate security risk of enterprise network [10] . Rather than state attack graph, Ou et al. proposed logical attack graph that could find dependency relation between vulnerabilities to avoid state explosion problem [11] . Though logical attack graph shows great advantage in shrinking state space, the result is hard to be interpreted. Sun et al. proposed a probabilistic approach and implemented a prototype system ZePro for zero-day attack paths identification [12] . Pan et al. came up with a systematic and automated approach to build a hybrid IDS to discovery attack paths for power systems [13] . Though this method improved efficiency a lot, they relied on experts' experience heavily, making it hard to apply in large scale network. Ding et al. presented a method which is based on the combination of finite state machine(FSM) and model checking technology(NuSMV) to analyse system safety [14] . To discover optimal attack path, Zhao et al. toke advantage of ant colony algorithm to optimize global security cost [15] . Wang et al. adopted heuristic search algorithm to generate attack graph and divided it into two stages: matching index table construction and attack graph construction [16] . Song et al. pruned branches of attack graph to discover attack path through greedy search strategy [17] .
Aside from attack graph based attack paths discovery methods, classical planning provides another perspective for discovering attack paths. Usually, classical planning algorithms aim at discovering paths under deterministic, static, finite, fully observable, discrete circumstance [18] . The application of classical planning algorithms in cyber security domain firstly appeared in 2008 international planning competition(IPC), from which on, classical planning based attack path discovery became mainstream research direction [19] . As shown in Figure 3 , there are two steps to implement attack paths discovery based on classical planning technology, first of which transformed the relevant network information, such as network topology, host configuration, vulnerability database et al. into planning domain definition language(PDDL) and the second toke advantage of classical planning algorithms, such as partial planning, hierarchical task network etc. to achieve attack paths discovery based on transformed PDDL [20] . The famous attack path discovery product that was developed based on classical planning is Core Impact automated penetration testing systems developed by SecureAuth corporation [21] . Boddy et al. demonstrated that the generation of attack paths for a simple but realistic web-based document control system with classical planning algorithms outperforms the prevailing state of the art in this area [22] . Roberts et al. extend the attack graph formalism by integrating user actions and supporting personalization that restrict the focus to those vulnerabilities present in a particular user/system combination. The enhanced attack graph was captured in PDDL with user specific attributes being included as facts, and it helped identify interventions that are most likely to reduce the system's susceptibility to attacks [23] .
In spite of importance of previous studies, there are still some limitations in existing attack paths discovery methods. For instance, the attack graph based method shows simple way to discover attack paths, but the computational complexity limits its application. Classical planning based attack paths discovery avoids this by using well studied planning algorithms and achieves better result, but it does not take deep consideration into penetration testing goal states related information, which influences efficiency(time consumption etc.) of discovering attack paths greatly. In order to achieve effective attack paths discovery on the basis of existing studies, there are three challenges: How to extract essential information according to goal states? How to model the process of attack paths discovery? How to incorporate those information into model so as to achieve effective attack paths discovery? To conquer these challenges, we proposed a compact graph planning based attack paths discovery algorithm. Firstly, a closure calculation algorithm is proposed to extract all related states according to penetration testing goals. Then a variant compact planning graph is proposed to model process of attack paths discovery. Lastly, the extracted information is incorporated into compact planning graph to prune irrelevant states so as to achieve effective attack paths discovery.
III. PRELIMINARY A. FUNCTIONAL DEPENDENCY THEORY
Functional dependency theory [24] originates from relational database theory, and it's a kind of constraint relation between sets of attributes from a database. In other words, functional dependency is a constraint that describes the relationship between attributes in a relation, which could help find all dependency attributes in a database. The detailed formalism of functional dependency theory is shown as follows:
Definition 1 (Relation pattern): Relation pattern R(U ) is attributes tuple, where each u ∈ U is specific attribute. The quantization of relation R is denoted as r, and r[u] represents attribute value.
Definition 2 (Functional Dependency):
A functional dependency(FD) α → β holds if for all pairs of tuples t, u in any legal instance satisfy the following equation:
where α and β denote sets of attributes separately. α → β is called attributes set α determined attributes set β or β is determined by α.
Definition 3 (Logically Implied):
A function dependency α → β is logically implied if all instances satisfying FD set F also satisfy α → β. We denote the set of all function dependency that logically implied by F as F + , namely closure of functional dependency set F.
Definition 4 (Closure of a Set of Attributes):
Closure of a set of attributes X with respect to FD set F is the set X + of all attributes that are functionally determined by using F + .
Given that X , Y and Z are sets of attributes in a relation R, there are several properties of functional dependencies, among which there are three which are most important, called Armstrong's axioms [25] :
• Augmentation. If X → Y , then XZ → YZ where XZ = {e|e ∈ X or e ∈ Y } and YZ is similar.
• Transitivity. Functional dependency X → Z holds if both X → Y and Y → Z hold. These three rules are axiomatization of functional dependencies that could be proved sound and complete, and any other rules could be inferred based on these rules. Several important secondary rules are introduced as follows:
• Union. Functional dependency X → YZ holds if both X → Y and X → Z hold.
• Decomposition. If X → YZ , then functional dependency X → Y and X → Z hold as well.
• Pseudotransitivity. Functional dependency WX → Z holds if both X → Y and WY → Z hold.
• Composition. Functional dependency XZ → YW hold if X → Y and Z → W hold separately. As functional dependency theory could lay well foundation for formalizing penetration testing process, we showed an example for better understanding.
B. EXAMPLE
Given a relational pattern R(U)=R(SID, SNAME, CID, GRADE, CNAME, TNAME, TAGE), where each attribute represents student ID, student name, class ID, grade, class name, teacher name and teacher age separately. From attribute set U, we could see that there are five obvious functional dependencies that make up for functional dependency set F that are shown as follows:
• SID → SNAME: Student name is totally determined by student ID.
• CID → CNAME: Class name is totally determined by class ID. • CID → TNAME: Class ID could determine teacher name solely.
• TNAME → TAGE: Teacher age is totally determined by teacher's name.
• (SNAME, CNAME) → GRADE: Student name and class name could point out grade deterministicly. Not only these obvious functional dependencies, there are still some other functional dependencies that could be inferred based on Armstrong's axiom rules which are shown as follows:
• (SID, CID) → GRADE. As GRADE is determined by SNAME and CNAME, SNAME is determined by SID and CNAME is determined by CID, Armstrong's axiom pseudotransitivity promises that GRADE is determined by SID and CID.
• CID → TAGE. Given CID → TNAME and TNAME → TAGE, it is easy to prove that TAGE is determined by CID on the basis of Armstrong's axioms transitivity rule. The closure of functional dependencies is all functional dependencies that hold in relational pattern R(U). For example, the closure of attributes set {GRADE} is {GRADE, SID, CID, CNAME}, denoted as {GRADE} + .
IV. METHODOLOGY
In this section, we proposed a compact graph planning based algorithm to achieve effective attack paths discovery through calculating closure of penetration testing goal states set. There are three parts in this section: Formalism and closure calculation, compact planning graph construction and solution extraction.
A. FORMALISM AND CLOSURE CALCULATION
Attack paths discovery could be formalized as tuple < S, A, G >, where state space S is composed of host information, network topology information and access privilege etc. action space A is set of attack action, each of which contains predicates, action name and effects, goal states set G is penetration testing goals, satisfying G ⊆ S. Figure 4 shows an example of state and action element in PDDL representation, from which we could see that there are 9 states on the left side and a Joomla_SQL_Remote_Code_Execution action on the right side. In order to transform attack paths discovery problem into functional dependencies representation, state space S is formalized as attribute set, where each element represents specific state, action a ∈ A is formalized as functional dependency x → y, where x = a.preconditions and y = a.effects ⊆ S represent precondition and effect states of action a separately. Goal states set G, where each element g represents specific penetration testing goal, could be formalized as subset of state set S. Given goal states set G, the first step is to calculate closure set of G which contains all possible preconditions of g that satisfy functional dependencies transformed from action space.
After formalizing attack paths discovery problem into PDDL, PDDL parser will transform conceptual states and actions into concrete actions and states, which is a heavily time-consuming process. Taking action Joomla_SQL_Remote_Code_Execution for example, there will be 16 actions given object sets{192.168. As there are many irrelevant states in whole state and action space, it's essential to remove those irrelevant states and actions so as to accelerate the efficiency of attack paths discovery. Traditional graph planning algorithm does not take deep consideration into pruning those irrelevant states, so that the attack paths efficiency is relatively low. Further, as action is totally determined by states, redundant states points out redundant actions implicitly. What only need to be done is pruning irrelevant states. In other words, it's essential to pick out those states that are relevant to goal states, namely closure of goal states set. Functional dependency theory shows the way to calculate closure of goal states set. There are two steps for closure calculation, the first of which iterates functional dependencies of action space to find the preconditions of goal states and the second takes the preconditions as new goals to calculate recursively until no new goal state appears. The closure calculation method is summarized in algorithm 1 which could promise the result closure set is sound and complete, namely any states that are relevant to goal states are all included in result closure set. The details of sound and complete proof of closure set could be referenced by [26] , [27] .
B. COMPACT PLANNING GRAPH CONSTRUCTION
After calculating closure of goal states set, compact planning graph is constructed layer by layer that is composed of two kinds of nodes, proposition nodes and action nodes. Proposition nodes describes available states currently, containing host information, network topology information etc. and action nodes describes available actions given current VOLUME 7, 2019 FIGURE 5. Example of compact planning graph extension (Graph starts from initial states and extends by iterating action and state space until reaching goal states set or stabilizing.).
Algorithm 1 Closure Calculation Algorithm

Input:
S: state space, contains combination of host, network topology and access privilege information G: goal states set, satisfying g ∈ G ⊆ S A: action space, satisfying β → γ ∈ A where β, γ ∈ S represent preconditions and effects of specific action Output:
closure of goal states set:
for each β → γ ∈ A:
states, containing scanning action, exploitation action etc. As shown in Figure 5, Also, all states in previous layer should be included in next layer without modification because these states could be used in further steps which is called maintenance action denoted as e. The iteration continues until the compact planning graph stabilizes, which means that L i+1 = L i or encountering goal state set G. As complete state set iteration is a timeconsuming process, we use closure of goal state set G + to prune those useless branches as so to achieve effective compact planning graph construction.
While extending compact planning graph, it is of great beneficial to record collision pairs within same layer. There are two types of collision pairs, namely action collision pairs and state collision pairs. Action collision pairs indicate that two contradictory states hold within same layer, for example, CVE-2017-7494 will crash samba service and any other vulnerabilities of samba service could not be exploited in the same layer. For each layer, a pair, o, o ∈ O i , of actions is defined to be collision if any of these conditions is met: Though layer extending will be a multi-step process, attack paths discovery will limit attack path length. Supposing there are M IP address in a specific network, the maximum attack path length will be M −1 at most because once an host is compromised there is no need to attack it again. We summarized compact planning graph construction process in algorithm 2.
C. ATTACK PATHS EXTRACTION
As shown in Figure 6 , the compact planning graph could be searched for a solution at this point once compact planning 
Algorithm 2 Compact Planning Graph Extension
Input:
goal states set G, closure of goal states set G + , action space A, host number M , old graph Graph, layer step Output:
compact planning graph: newGraph
for each a ∈ A:
if a.preconditions⊆ L i−1 and a.effects ⊆ G + : 5:
newGraph.add(L i ) 10: else 11:
return None 12: end if
return newGraph graph has been constructed up to L i . Here, depth-first based backward search strategy [28] is adopted to extract solution from graph. Given goal states set G, and there are three conditions for solution extraction from L i which could be described as follows:
• G L i . In this case, there is no attack paths solution given current network information because goal states are not included in layer L i and no new state will appear in further layers.
• G ⊆ L i and L i = L i+1 . In this case, an attack paths solution may exists. If backward search could not find a solution, then it can be extended further by adding O i and L i+1 . The extended graph can then be searched for a solution plan recursively.
• G ⊆ L i and L i = L i+1 . In this case, an attack paths solution may exists. If backward search could not find a solution, then there is no solution given current network information because no new state will appear in further layers. Attack paths discovery algorithm derived from the graph planning algorithm which interleaves graph extension and solution search. Either a solution is reported at some layer or the algorithm correctly reports that no available attack path exists after the compact planning graph stabilizes. Rather than a fully specified plan, the extracted solution is a layered plan, which is a special form of partial plan [29] . All of solution actions are distributed in some specific layers, and the layered plan could be represented as follows:
where each R i is a set of available exploitation actions. Within any specific R i , the available actions are noncontradictory and may be applied in any order without interfering the implementation of final penetration testing goal states. The only constraint is that every action in R i must be applied before any actions in R i+1 for each i from 1 to k in any specific attack path solution.
Algorithm 3 Attack Paths Discovery Algorithm
Input: goal states set G, state space S, initial states set I 0 , action space A, Host number M . Output: attack paths: In order to obtain a fully specified attack path, the layered plan needs to be linearized by specifying a cause-effect order for the actions that is consistent with layer constraints. For example, weak password action(CVE-2018-0121) should be before eternal blue action(CVE-2017-0146) and after web SQL injection action(CVE-2017-12615) in Figure 1 . And we summarize compact planning graph based attack path discovery algorithm as follows, where Closure(G) stands for closure calculation process for penetration testing goals, extendGraph represents compact graph planning extension process described in algorithm 2.
V. EXPERIMENT A. EXPERIMENT SETUP
Experiment was carried out on typical enterprise network to compare our algorithm against existing attack paths discovery algorithms. As shown in Figure 7 , the experiment network structure is composed of three parts: DMZ area, workspace area and inner service area that are connected by a firewall and router. The firewall rules allows the internet host to visit web server in DMZ area, but not workspace hosts and inner services. Hosts in workspace could visit not only DMZ area but inner service area. Given the network structure shown above, the basic idea of penetration testing is composed of three steps: First, the hacker breaks into the DMZ area via SQL injection. Then, the hacker discovers the vulnerabilities of the workspace hosts, and exploits them to get login user and password of file server. And eventually hacker obtained sensitive information on file server based on achieved information.
The baseline approaches we compare in the experiment includes:
Forward search algorithm [30] : Forward search starts with initial states and finds all available action successors until resulting states contain goal states. Graph planning algorithm [31] : Graphplan is a generalpurpose planner for STRIPS-style domains. There are two core steps in graph planning, containing planning graph construction and solution extraction.
MulVAL [5] : MulVAL stands for ''Multi-host, Multistage Vulnerability Analysis Language''. It is a research tool for security practitioners and system administrators to better manage the configuration of an enterprise network such that the security risks are appropriately controlled.
B. EXPERIMENT RESULT
As host number plays an important role in evaluating effectiveness of attack paths discovery algorithms, Table 1 tells the relationship between increasing host number and mean value, standard deviation of attack paths discovery time consumption after fixing vulnerability number to 5. Generally, it is easy to find from Table 1 that the proposed compact graph planning based attack paths discovery algorithm shows great advantage in discovering hidden attack paths than graph plan and forward search based algorithms. The mean value of graph planning based attack paths discovery algorithm is about 3s from the beginning and ends with 5.7s. Forward search based attack paths discovery algorithms showed relative lower time consumption from 2.2s to 4s. However, our proposed compact graph planning based attack paths discovery algorithm shows average time consumption from 1.9s to 2.3s, which is less than graph planning, forward search based attack paths discovery algorithms. The compact graph planning based attack paths algorithm benefits from eliminating useless states effectively at the very beginning while the other algorithms could not eliminate those redundant states, resulting in increasing time consumption. The time consumption of MulVAL is the least because increased host shows no effect on enlarging branches of attack graph, so that the time consumption is limited. Even though the time consumption of proposed algorithm is not as good as Mul-VAL when host number increases, it shows great advantage when vulnerability number increases which will be described in detail later.
In order to describe the relationship between time consumption and host number intuitively, the box relation diagram of time consumption and host number is showed in Figure 8 . It is easy to find that both graph planning and forward search based attack paths discovery algorithms show linear increasing time consumption along with host number VOLUME 7, 2019 4 .3 appears as precondition for the action. Theoretically, supposing that there are m objects, h goals, n actions and each action contains k preconditions. There are totally hnm k actions which should be traversed backward by graph planning based algorithm within each layer. The longer attack path it is, the more actions and states it would iterate, making it time wasting process. And it is the same to forward search based algorithm. However, compact graph planning based algorithm could prune irrelevant actions and states according to dependency relationship between goals and actions, so that there will only be several relevant actions and states occurred in compact planning graph structure, making solution extraction process much more effective.
Fixing host number to 57, Figure 9 tells how time consumption changed along with vulnerability number axis from the view of respective approach in a general way. In Figure 9 , the green lines denote the time consumption of compact graph planning based attack paths algorithm along with vulnerability number axis, while blue, orange and red lines represent time consumed by forward search, graph planning and attack graph based attack paths algorithms. It is easy to tell that compact graph planning based algorithm outperforms the other three algorithms in discovering attack paths with increasing size of vulnerability number. Forward search based and graph planning based algorithms share similar development of time consumption and increasing vulnerability number shows little influence on performance of attack graph and the proposed compact graph planning based algorithm at the very beginning. But when vulnerability number reaches 12, the time consumption of attack graph based algorithm grows exponentially because of state space combinational explosion problem, limiting its application in large network scenario. However, compact graph planning based algorithm shows great robustness than MulVAL over increasing size of vulnerability number. This is because increasing vulnerabilities create much irrelevant actions that would not lead to goal states, and compact graph planning based algorithm do not need to traverse those irrelevant actions while other algorithms do not own the ability to prune those actions, so that increasing vulnerability number shows much influence on time performance. Figure 10 tells the time consumption of all attack path discovery algorithms on both vulnerability number and host number. Performance of forward search, graph planning, compact graph planning and attack graph based algorithm are shown in subfigure (a)(b)(c)(d) separately, from which we could see that host number shows much influence on time performance than vulnerability number for both forward search and graph planning based algorithms, especially for graph planning based algorithm. Attack graph based attack paths discovery algorithm shows good performance when vulnerability number is less than 12, after which, time consumption grows exponentially, making it hard to apply in complicated network scenario. However, our proposed compact graph planning based attack paths discovery algorithm shows little reaction to increasing size of both action number and vulnerability number because all of those irrelevant states and actions are pruned before attack paths discovery process. After pruning irrelevant states and actions, only few states and actions will be left for attack paths discovery with compact graph planning. Fixing host number to 57 and vulnerability number to 50, we compare the precision of attack paths discovery by counting tried penetration times for final successful penetration testing through metasploit [32] under experiment scenario. The result is shown in table 2, from which we could see that attack graph, graph planing and compact graph planning based attack paths discovery algorithms could achieve successful penetration testing eventually, while forward search based algorithm could not because it finds only one wrong attack path during discovering process. The other three algorithms achieve successful penetration by discovering all possible attack paths where each step matches preconditions of specific vulnerability. However, as state space of attack graph model is far large than graph plan and compact graph planning based attack paths discovery algorithms, there are much branches in attack graph, causing large tried penetration times, so that graph plan and compact graph planning based algorithms show great advantage in discovering attack paths. Even though graph plan based algorithm shares same precision with compact graph planning based attack paths discovery algorithm, it consumes much time than compact graph planning based algorithm shown in figure 10 , proving the effectiveness of compact graph planing based attack paths discovery algorithm.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a compact graph planning based attack paths discovery algorithm to discover hidden attack paths. Firstly, we formalized attack paths discovery problem into PDDL and calculate the closure of goal states based on functional dependency theory. Secondly, we construct compact planning graph to describe attack paths discovery process based on achieved goal states closure. Thirdly, solution is extracted through depth-first backward search algorithm. Finally, the experimental results demonstrated that our proposed compact graph planning based attack paths discovery algorithm could discover hidden attack paths effectively when compared with existing known attack paths discovery algorithms. And we hope that our research work could contribute to future studies.
